We test whether uncertainty in the CEO's compensation influences the firm's investment decisions, using panel compensation data and cross-sectional investment data. Given the prospect of bearing extra risk, a rational agent reacts to minimize the impact of such risk. We provide evidence that CEOs with high earnings uncertainty invest less. As expected, the negative impact of permanent earnings uncertainty on firm investment is larger than that of transitory earnings uncertainty. The results are robust to several alternate specifications and lend support to Stultz' over-investment hypothesis. Knowing how investment is tied to the CEO's earnings uncertainty helps in building the correct compensation package.
I.

Introduction
This paper tests whether uncertainty in the CEO's compensation affects the firm's investment decisions. Our new approach models and measures the CEO's earnings uncertainty using panel (cross-sectional time-series) compensation data. We pay special attention to decomposing the executives' earnings uncertainty into permanent and transitory components. We then explain capital expenditures and acquisitions (investment henceforth) as a function of uncertainty, as well as firm specific characteristics. We find strong support that the firm's investment growth is negatively related to the CEO's earnings uncertainty.
There has been much work investigating corporate managers' incentive to maximize shareholder wealth, largely motivated by Jensen and Meckling (1976) . A subset of this literature examines the determinants of executive compensation and its impact on managerial decision making. There are many methodological issues to be resolved in this area, and many questions about the impact of executive compensation on managerial behavior remained unanswered. Smith and Watts (1992) explain the usefulness of documenting robust empirical relations among firms' investment and compensation policies. Gaver and Gaver (1995) and Mehran (1995) follow with papers that also explore empirical relationships between corporate financial policy variables and executive compensation.
Similar to Smith and Watts, Gaver and Gaver, and Mehran, we present exploratory empirical evidence on the relationship between corporate financial policy variables involving executive compensation; in this case corporate investment and the earnings uncertainty of the CEO.
These variables are part of a simultaneous system that determines the firm's value and how that value is allocated to stakeholders. Consequently, the relationships reported are not necessarily causal. Instead the results document empirical regularities between corporate investment and executive compensation that may be useful in determining corporate policy. The paper provides a fresh perspective on why investment rates differ across firms.
2 Section II of the paper reviews the literature on executive compensation and investment, and develops testable hypotheses of the relationship between compensation and investment.
Section III describes the data. Section IV explains the empirical methodology, and Section V presents the empirical results. Section VI offers a summary and conclusions.
II. Executive Compensation and Investment
A. Executive Compensation
Studies that examine the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance have produced conflicting results, rendering the topic prone for further investigation. Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) discuss aspects of optimal contracting where current economic theory and actual practice seem particularly disassociated given the lack of correlation between pay and performance. Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue that how CEOs are paid is more relevant than how much they are paid and find that CEO compensation is largely independent of performance and that the relationship between pay and performance has weakened over time. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) investigate empirically the influence of executive compensation on firms' investment and find conflicting evidence of this influence depending on whether the level or the growth rate of investment is tracked. They find that capital spending increases during the CEOs last years in office and argue that this is puzzling since incentive compensation plans typically are not tied to shareholder value. Rather, the compensation package usually depends on accounting performance which the CEOs should want to keep high in their final years in office. None of these papers explicitly examine the volatility of CEO compensation over time, and its influence on the firm's investment.
Several recent studies examine the relationship between the firm's investment opportunity set and the structure of the CEO's compensation package. Lewellen, Loderer, and Martin (1987) find that growth firms use more stock-based compensation, as opposed to salary and bonus, compared to low-growth firms. Smith and Watts (1992) argue that firms with valuable growth opportunities have a high degree of information asymmetry and are expected to utilize incentive compensation to reduce agency costs. They examine industry-level data and find that high-growth firms utilize long-term incentive compensation more than low-growth firms. Gaver and Gaver (1995) examine the proportions of executive pay derived from salary, bonus, long-term incentive compensation, and stock-based compensation. They find that executives of growth firms receive a larger proportion of their compensation from long-term incentive compensation. Mehran (1995) finds a positive relationship between firm performance and compensation structure. These studies suggest that the structure of executive compensation is related to the firm's investment policy.
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B. Earnings Uncertainty and Corporate Investment
We utilize panel data on CEO compensation to determine expected earnings and earnings uncertainty, then relate these characteristics investment behavior. We assume that the CEO's expectations about his future earnings level, and earnings uncertainty are important influences on the firm's investment choices.
We develop measures of CEO earnings uncertainty, following methods from the precautionary savings literature 2 . The rational expectations literature shows that economic agents alter current behavior in response to predicted future occurrences. Our forward-looking or rational expectations approach to the problem emphasizes the importance of future expected states of the world. In our application, the relation between corporate investment and earnings of the CEO may be erroneous without the inclusion of a measure of the CEO's earnings uncertainty, as well as the level of expected earnings.
3 1 Gaver and Gaver (1995) discuss the difficulty of determining how executive compensation packages are determined. They point out that although the firm's investment opportunity set is likely to influence compensation policy, the management incentives that arise from the compensation packages undoubtedly influence the investment decisions of managers. Since both decisions arise simultaneously, optimal compensation policies for a given (exogenous) investment opportunity set are difficult to determine. This simultaneity problem is also noted by Smith and Watts (1992) and Mehran (1995) , and is an area for future research.
2 See Leland (1968) and Kimball (1990) for a theoretical development and Kazarosian (1997) and Lusardi (1992) for empirical work using panel data.
3 Our main results demonstrate that future earnings uncertainty influences capital investment (table 2.) Additional investigation reveals that contemporaneously measured uncertainty and investment also have a statistically significant relationship. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we test the contemporaneous model.
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We develop two competing hypotheses regarding the impact of compensation structure on capital investment. The Over-Investment Hypothesis--many papers argue that managers may over invest in capital projects. Stulz (1990) explains that managers want to maximize investment (even in negative NPV projects) in order to maximize perquisites. Murphy (1985) documents a positive relationship between management compensation and firm size, suggesting that managers have an incentive to invest in projects to make the firm larger. Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) find that compensation is positively related to promotions, which are more plentiful in large firms. Greater compensation, perquisites and promotions are all factors that may lead to over-investment.
Managers insulated from outside discipline may be more likely to over-invest, leading to a reduction in firm value (Stulz (1988) ). Since the CEO knows the nature of his compensation contract, future compensation provides an unbiased estimate of the CEO's expected future earnings. Managers with high earnings uncertainty, due to being tied to firm performance, will seek to hedge through reducing investments. As a result of managerial risk aversion there may be less over-investment.
A reduction in investment may also be a direct result of a lack of free cash flow. 4 Yet a lack of cash flow may in turn cause an increase in cash flow volatility. If cash flow volatility and compensation volatility are correlated, then this lack of cash flow could also reduce investment through the increase of compensation volatility. To isolate the impact of risk aversion on investment, we control for growth opportunities, cash flow uncertainty, and free cash flow.
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The Under-Investment Hypothesis--Larcker (1983) finds that the adoption of performance plans is associated with an increase in corporate investment. A change in managerial decision making occurs due to a lengthening of the decision-making horizon of the manager. Focusing on longer-term positive cash flows will only make projects more desirable to managers. Managers 4 Jensen (1986) argues that firms with high free cash flow may face an agency problem whereby managers may invest these cash flows in diversification strategies that are unprofitable. Firms with low free cash flow may invest less in risk-reducing strategies, leading to further lower investment due to the incentive compensation. 5 We thank an anonymous referee for emphasizing the importance of including free cash flow as a separate explanatory variable to sort out these two effects.
5 with high earnings uncertainty, due to being tied to firm performance, will focus more on longterm cash flows. As a result there may be more capital investment.
We estimate equation 1 below to test the above competing hypotheses. Tables 2 through   A2 provide evidence to support the Over-Investment Hypothesis--as the manager's earnings uncertainty rises, the firm's investment falls.
III. Data
Recall return on equity to measure performance, and the coefficient of variation of the firm's cash flow to measure firm risk. In line with Smith and Watts' discussion of the relationship between investment and dividend policies we control for the dividend payout ratio. Since financial leverage 6 may also impact investment policy we use the debt to equity ratio as a control. Similar to Mehran (1995), we utilize the percentage of shares owned by CEOs to control for managerial ownership.
As noted above, free cash flow may impact a firms ability to over invest in risk reducing projects.
We control for free cash flow following Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) 
IV. Empirical Implementation
A. Relating Capital Spending and Earnings Uncertainty
In light of the above discussion (Section II), an empirical analysis of a firm's corporate investment policy should incorporate earnings uncertainty and permanent earnings. We perform the estimation in two stages. The first exploits the Forbes panel data to create measures of permanent earnings and earnings uncertainty for each executive, following the models detailed below. We estimate a panel equation for individual earnings profiles to impute permanent earnings for each executive. We then calculate earnings uncertainty (our key explanatory variable) from each executive's earnings profile residual.
The second stage (our main estimating equation) is a cross-sectional regression that explains the log of investment as a proportion of net sales using the uncertainty and permanent earnings proxies as our two key regressors. 6 We also include a standard vector of firm characteristics typically used to describe capital investment such as firm size, leverage, investment opportunities, industry dummies and others described above (section 3) and in the results.
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The general form of the investment equation is,
I i is capital spending for firm i, NS i is net sales, U i is future earnings uncertainty of the executive of firm i, Y i P is permanent earnings of executive i (both U i , and Y i P are described in detail below) and X i is a vector of firm and CEO characteristics that is assumed to influence investment. The error term e i~N (0, 2 ) Table 1 contains descriptive statistics of all variables used in equation (1). Tables 2, 3 and appendices contain results from various specifications of regression equation (1).
B. Construction of Permanent Earnings Intuition
In this section we describe our empirical model of permanent earnings, following King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982) and our earnings uncertainty model following Kazarosian (1997). Our hypothesis is that executives' earnings uncertainty (both permanent and transitory) will influence the capital investment decision that executives make. A necessary first step is to construct a measure of expected (permanent) earnings, around which uncertainty can be carefully measured.
This permanent earnings is also a key regressor in our investment equation, since any claim that earnings uncertainty impacts investment must control for the level of the earnings.
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Investment is measured in 1988, while permanent earnings is calculated using [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] data. An example of permanent earnings is what the executive expects to receive from a contract next year. An example of a permanent earnings shock is a raise, while an example of a transitory earnings shock is a one time bonus payment--it is not expected to continue. These shocks generate uncertainty associated with each type of earnings, which we model and calculate below. The 9 strength of our proxies for both permanent earnings, and earnings uncertainty is that we use timeseries data to estimate them.
Each executive in our sample has between three, and seven annual earnings observations (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) . Our empirical implementation of the permanent earnings model reflects the bufferstock idea that a saver considers a short term future earnings stream rather than her lifetime earnings stream.
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To estimate permanent earnings we pool all executives' time-series earnings data within each of nine industries, and express the executive's log-earnings as a cubic in age. We then estimate earnings with nine separate industry-specific random effects models. Each industry has as many earnings profiles as there are executives in that industry. Within each industry, each logearnings profile has the same slope reflecting the same expected growth rate of earnings. Across industries, the executives are assumed to expect different earnings growth, and therefore the slopes are allowed to differ. The individual-specific nature of the permanent earnings measure comes form the profile's intercept--each executive's profile intercept is unique. It would be possible, yet impractical to allow both the slope and intercept to be executive-specific since the earnings profile is a cubic in age, and we have only five (on average) earnings values per person.
One advantage of this profile estimation technique is that it incorporates executive-specific earnings determinants, such as ability or luck. Another advantage is that it helps to eliminate transitory earnings since the profile is derived from each executive's time-series earnings rather than a single cross-sectional observation. Also, by using a panel we can directly measure uncertainty around the executive-specific earnings profiles. This idiosyncratic uncertainty measure is impossible without time-series earnings data.
8 Carroll (1991) argues that the correct interpretation of Friedman's permanent earnings is roughly expected earnings (earnings in the absence of transitory shocks) or the expected value of a probability distribution. This expected earnings, rather than the annuity value of total lifetime resources, is closer to the permanent earnings concept that Friedman described. Our panel estimate of permanent earnings below closely follows Carroll's interpretation.
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Model
The formal permanent earnings model begins with:
where permanent earnings ( Y i P ) is annual earnings with no transitory component, evaluated at the same age for everyone. Z i is a vector of observable characteristics, with the parameter vector .
2 ) is the time constant executive-specific error.
Current and permanent earnings differ by virtue of the executive's position on his ageearnings profile g( AG it ) , and by a transitory earnings component. Current earnings E it in any particular year for executive i, in terms of permanent earnings is:
where it is the current, observation-specific error, assumed to have an arbitrary covariance structure that is constant across executives, and is uncorrelated with the executive-specific error i .
The observation-specific error it includes both permanent and transitory shocks, because in estimation the profile's slope is not updated over time. An ideal measure of permanent earnings would include only the permanent component of it . Although we cannot decompose it into its permanent and transitory components, we can isolate the standard deviation of the components which serve as proxies for permanent and transitory earnings uncertainty.
Substituting equation (3) into equation (2) yields:
Equation (A2.3) shows the components of current earnings and its associated errors.
it and i must be separated in estimation to identify the executive-specific component ˆ i of each intercept ( +ˆ i ). This separation is possible only with panel data.
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To distinguish permanent from current earnings using panel data, we estimate
ln E it is the log of current earnings for person i in year t, J k are occupation dummies, and g( AG it ) is a cubic in age. The log specification ensures that our earnings uncertainty measure--the standard deviation of the log-earnings profile residual--is not necessarily proportional to the level of permanent earnings.
We estimate (5) using a random effects model. The executive-specific profiles are defined by between three and seven observations per executive, and distinguished by a unique random Estimated permanent earnings Y i P is the annual average of the present discounted value of expected (predicted) earnings, from the executive-specific profile (equation (5)), within a standardized age bracket (55-59). 11 This earnings proxy helps to control for Life-Cycle behavior in our capital investment regressions.
C. Construction of Earnings Uncertainty Intuition
Earnings uncertainty is unobservable. Yet in the Forbes data, executives' earnings over time is observable. Under reasonable assumptions outlined above, we construct a measure of permanent (expected) earnings from the executives' time-series earnings process. As observed 10 We account for possible serial correlation in µ it by imposing no restrictions on its process and by treating the random effects regression as a seemingly unrelated regression system (SUR)--one equation for each time period--following Chamberlain (1982) . If the µ it are correlated, SUR will yield efficient estimates. 11 We chose this age bracket to be in line with the average age of the executives in our sample. In the first year of our panel (1988) the executives' average age is 55.
earnings become more errant around expected earnings, we assume uncertainty increases. The standard deviation of each executives' log-earnings profile residual is our total uncertainty proxy.
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There are important advantages to this uncertainty proxy. First, since the earnings profile incorporates predictable growth, the proxy is desirably void of expected changes in human capital.
Because of this, uncertainty will be less likely overstated. Second, since the proxy comes from up to seven earnings observations over ten years, its value incorporates the degree of persistence in the earnings generating process that is specific to each executive. Kimball and Mankiw (1989) and Caballero (1990) indicate that the magnitude of precautionary saving effects in a multiperiod context depends critically on the persistence of earnings shocks.
Using panel data is only a necessary first step in capturing the different magnitude of precautionary saving effects predicted by permanent and temporary shocks. The observationspecific log-earnings profile's residual must be dissected into its permanent and transitory standard deviation (uncertainty) components. To isolate these components of total uncertainty, our model below describes our application of the decomposition technique developed by Hall and Mishkin (1982) and Carroll (1992) .
Model
Earnings are assumed to be more uncertain the more erratic the variation around an expected trend. We use two related methods to proxy earnings uncertainty. Each is generated from the current, observation-specific residuals of the executive's profile (ˆ it ) and is therefore less likely to confound the effects of predictable earnings growth and uncertainty. The residuals ˆ it contain both permanent and transitory shocks because the profile's slope is not updated over time.
The first uncertainty proxy, which includes both shocks, is simply the standard deviation of each executive's earnings profile residuals ˆ it . The second uncertainty proxy isolates the transitory and permanent components that compose total uncertainty. The uncertainty 12 Since earnings are in log form, the uncertainty measure is measured relative to earnings size (i.e. the coefficient of variation).
13 decomposition complements our method of measuring executive-specific profiles, in creating a unique value for both permanent and transitory uncertainty, measured directly from time series residuals of each profile. Carroll (1992) shows that if the permanent shock and the transitory shock are i.i.d.
and uncorrelated, then
where d is the number of years between earnings observations. 13 First we identify predictable Life-Cycle earnings changes using equation (5) estimates, then apply (6) to decompose the variance of the remaining time-series change ˆ it+ d .
14 Equation (6) shows that permanent shocks are cumulative whereas transitory shocks are not. Current earnings in any year E it+ d consists of permanent earnings in year t, all past permanent shocks, growth, and the current transitory shock.
Two or more d values solves (5) for each executive, because if the mean of r(d)
provides an unbiased estimate of (5). Although this sample's mean ˆ it is close to zero (<.01), an F-test can not reject executive-specific earnings growth rates.
D. Summary
We estimate the panel equation for individual earnings profiles (equation (4) Table 2 contains estimates of equation (1) above which addresses our main question--does uncertainty in the CEOs compensation influence the firm's investment decisions? In specifications 1 and 2 (both a and b) we find that the impact of future compensation uncertainty on the current investment to sales ratio is highly significant, negative and large. The evidence conforms to theoretical predictions that rising earnings uncertainty (from pay-for-performance contracts) causes executives to invest less. In other words, our results support the over investment hypothesis (Stultz 1988) described in section II. These results are robust in light of our broad set of control variables, and alternate specifications.
V. Empirical Results
A. Main Results
We control for two key executive-specific characteristics--permanent earnings and managerial ownership. Including these controls eliminates the possibility that our earnings uncertainty coefficient embodies the influence of these two variables--likely positively correlated to uncertainty. Our firm-specific controls are firm risk (cash flow uncertainty), financial leverage (debt to equity ratio), investment opportunity (market to book ratio), firm size (sales), firm performance (return on equity), dividend payout ratio, free cash flow, and nine industry dummies.
The firm controls are typical capital expenditure explanatory variables, without which, we could not have confidence in our strong earnings uncertainty result.
The total earnings uncertainty coefficient of -1.4 is significant at the 1% level (specification 1 (a)). At sample means, doubling earnings uncertainty reduces investment's share of total sales by 22 percent. This elasticity translates into an approximate $137 million decline in capital investment spending. The adjusted R-squared is 0.24 and the F-statistic shows that the overall regression is significant at the 1% level. This negative, and significant coefficient for executive earnings risk indicates that even after accounting for the influence of expected firm risk (and the executive's expected future earnings) the riskiness of the CEO's earnings matters for the firm's investment.
Specifications 1 (a) and 2 (a) are identical except that both the executive's earnings uncertainty and the firm's cash-flow uncertainty measures are calculated using data five years hence for specification 1 (a) versus using data four years hence for specification 2 (a). The earnings uncertainty coefficient remains statistically significant for the five year window, yet the estimates' size falls as the length of the window increases. This supports the standard intuitive interpretation of the Life-Cycle hypothesis that people consider a short term future in making economic decisions.
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B. Additional Results
Sub-specifications (a) and (b) of table 2 differ by virtue of the uncertainty variables used--(b) uses the permanent and transitory components separately. Permanent uncertainty isolates the persistent component of the earning's shock. It is important to dissect the shocks, because we expect permanent shocks to have a larger influence on economic behavior. Since permanent shocks are expected to persist (e.g. a raise) and transitory shocks (a bonus) are not long lasting, we expect larger coefficients on permanent uncertainty.
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Indeed when executives are looking ahead four years (Specification 1 (b)), permanent shocks have a larger influence (31%) on the investment to sales ratio, than have transitory shocks. 17 Yet Specification 2 (b) shows that when earnings uncertainty is perceived five years hence, the point estimates indicate that transitory shocks significantly influence investment while permanent shocks do not. This result may reflect the reduced ability of the executive to predict permanent earnings (and permanent shocks) as the forward looking window is extended. 15 The coefficient on earnings uncertainty is statistically significant for the regression using earnings data six years hence, yet becomes insignificant using data seven years hence. As expected, the coefficient's size falls as the length of the window increases (-0.819 and -0.645 for seven years respectively.) Please see Appendix Table A1 available from the author for the complete regression results from the extended windows. Appendix table A2 addresses an additional possible objection to the main specification. We substitute the dependent variable measured in levels rather than logs and find the same statistically significant qualitative results as in Table 2 . Also, not included in appendix, we substitute the dependent variable measured as the difference from the industry (level) mean--same statistically significant qualitative results as Table 2 . 16 See Skinner (1988) and Blanchard and Mankiw (1988) for theoretical background. 17 Carroll and Samwick (1992) and Kazarosian (1997) find that permanent shocks are larger than their transitory counterparts in precautionary savings studies. [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] for our control variables--managerial ownership, debt to equity ratio, market to book ratio, sales, return on equity, dividend payout ratio and the level of free cash flow. We find that our main results are robust. An increase in the executive's earnings uncertainty squelches contemporaneously measured firm investment. This is true for the impact of total earnings uncertainty on investment (Specification 1), as well as for both permanent and transitory uncertainty (Specification 2). Consistent with our forward looking model, we also find that permanent shocks impact investment more strongly than temporary shocks. A notable difference in results of this contemporaneous model is that the coefficients of the debt-to-equity ratio and the free cash flow is now statistically significant at the 1% level (Specifications 1 and 2)
VI. Conclusion
Our findings indicate that uncertainty in CEO compensation has a statistically significant negative effect on a firm's investment. This result is robust under various. Increasing the time over which uncertainty is calculated (up to six years), aggregating investments, using a level rather than a log specification, or using a difference from the mean specification all produce the same qualitative results. Decomposing the future earnings uncertainty into permanent and transitory components reveal that both components affect investments negatively. As expected, the negative impact of the CEO's expected permanent earnings uncertainty on firm investment is larger than the impact of transitory uncertainty.
This investigation brings together two important (and largely independent) strands of research -the effect of labor earnings uncertainty on consumer behavior and the findings that agency costs influence firm level investment. While there is substantial evidence that the desire to hedge labor earnings uncertainty affects an individual's saving behavior, research on the affect of earnings uncertainty on CEO's actions are non existent. Our findings indicate that this new channel of influence -a CEO's desires to hedge labor earnings risk -may influence a firm's investment behavior. A natural direction for future research is to investigate more specific models that explore particular factors associated with earnings variability and then re-estimate a similar investment model. Given the importance of stock options in CEO's compensation and the increase in the CEO's future earnings uncertainty, additional research is needed to investigate the corporate policy implication of such changes. Specifically, uncertainties associated with incentive pay may affect the CEO's desire to hedge and consequently influence a firm's investments decision. Least Squares Regression Results of Equation (1) a Specification 1 (a) and 2 (a)--Investment response to total earnings uncertainty. b Specification 1(b) and 2 (b)--Investment response to permanent and transitory earnings uncertainty. Uncertainty (both earnings and cash flow) calculated with a four year, and five year forward looking window beginning in 1988 for specifications 1 and 2 respectively. Significance shown for the 1 (***), 5 (**) and 10 (*) percent levels. a Specification 1A and 2A--Investment response to total earnings uncertainty. Uncertainty (both earnings and cash flow) calculated with a six year, and seven year forward looking window beginning in 1988 for specifications 1A and 2A respectively. Significance shown for the 1 (***), 5 (**) and 10 (*) percent levels. 8.228x10
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